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Abstract	  
This article identifies how a reliability-seeking organization can respond flexibly to disruptive events. We study 
complex subsea operations that inspect, maintain and repair oil and gas installations on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. A superordinate leader is put in charge of a tightly coupled ‘multiteam system’ in the crucial 
execution phase of the operation, and his primary leadership function is task coordination. When unexpected 
disruptive events occur, which the formal leader cannot address, other individuals contain the event by 
performing leadership functions in his place, without explicit delegation. We call this mechanism informal 
leadership redundancy. We provide verification of it through an extended case study, making use of both field 
observations and interviews. We explore the conditions under which this form of redundancy can be effective. 
 
Keywords: Multiteam systems, redundancy, high-reliability organizations, ambiguity, 
improvisation, subsea operations. 
 
 
In complex organizations engaged in high-risk work, where operations are tightly coupled, 
there is little margin for error. The impact of external challenges and internal difficulties can 
set in motion consequences that are hard to predict and difficult to control. For those reasons, 
accidents and failure in complex organizations are in one sense ‘normal’ (Perrow 1999a). 
There are, however exceptions, and studies of high reliability organizations (HROs4), such as 
aircraft carriers, nuclear power plants, power grids and air traffic control towers have sought 
to understand how some organizations avoid the failure rates that one might expect (Bigley & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This research has been funded by The Research Council of Norway and by collaborating companies in the Haugesund region. 
4 A difficulty with the term HRO is that it is held up as an ideal and also serves as a descriptive term for organizations that operate 
successfully and safely with high-hazard technologies. Vogus and Welbourne (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003) have made a  distinction between 
HROs that operate in dangerous environments and high-reliability seeking organizations where the risk concerns competition and innovation, 
and not physical danger. In this article, we use the term HRO more loosely, to describe organizations of both types. 
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Roberts, 2001; Bourrier 1996; Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Roberts 1990; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993).  
 
Two decades of research have found that such organizations, to be successful, must be both 
structured and flexible (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). As Faraj 
and Xiao state, “(…) on the one hand, there is a need for tight structuring, formal 
coordination, and hierarchical decision making to ensure a clear division of responsibilities, 
prompt decision processes, and timely action; but, on the other hand, because of the need for 
rapid action and the uncertain environment, there is a competing need to rely on flexible 
structures, on-the-spot decision making, and informal coordination modes. Thus, such 
organizations paradoxically emphasize both formal and improvised coordination 
mechanisms” (Faraj & Xiao, 2006, p. 1157).  While the concept of balancing structure and 
flexibility is broadly accepted as a key success factor in reliability-seeking organizations, 
research continues to examine how this balance operates in practice; for example, who makes 
decisions when unexpected and disruptive events occur, how authority migrates in a 
hierarchical system, and to what degree actions are taken outside or within existing 
procedures (Barton& Sutcliffe, 2009). 
  
The present research is a case study of complex subsea operations that inspect, maintain and 
repair oil and gas installations on the Norwegian continental shelf. The work is complex, 
high-risk, strongly regulated and dictated by procedures. Previous research has shown that 
standardized rules and explicit procedures can enable people to coordinate their actions, 
detect and correct errors, and resolve conflicts (Hale & Borys, 2013; Pelegrin 2013). 
Schulman (Schulman 1993), in his study of a nuclear power plant, noted the ‘zealotry’ and 
competitive spirit with which  employees at all levels engaged in drafting new procedures. 
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However, while detailed rules and processes reduce uncertainty, they assume a level of 
predictability (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Knowing the specific steps to take in a situation is 
useful as long as the situation conforms to expectations based on past experience; but in 
dynamic environments predictability can be elusive. An important question is how 
organizations that rely on procedural discipline can respond flexibly when unexpected events 
occur. Previous research has described a variety of factors that enable HROs to anticipate and 
contain the unknown (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Bourrier 1996; Klein et al., 2006; Roberts 
1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), one of which is to take advantage of 
redundancies or slack5 (Roberts 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993; La  Porte 1996; Roberts 1990) 
.  
In this research we focus on one particular way of creating organizational slack through 
leadership redundancy. By leadership redundancy we mean individuals (other than the person 
normally in charge) who take the lead in coordination, decision making, problem solving, 
coaching, and other leadership functions, “the things that need to be done for the team to meet 
its needs and function effectively” (Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010, p. 9). Leadership 
redundancy can be a formal arrangement, such as when a co-pilot steps in for the pilot. In our 
research, however, we found situations where individuals, without explicit delegation, and on 
their own initiative, take care of leadership functions (Morgeson et al., 2010) outside their 
formal role. We show that slack informal leadership resources are utilized to contain 
disruptive events, which we refer to as informal leadership redundancy.  
Subsea operations are conducted by multiteam systems (Johannessen, McArthur, & Jonassen, 
2012)– a complex organizational structure. Mathieu et al. (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001) 
define a multiteam system as a group of component teams, which work towards a common, 
overarching goal. Multiteam systems are increasingly being used in dynamic environments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The terms are often used interchangeably in the literature. Both are talked about as surplus resources, while 
redundancy sometimes is also used to describe a particular arrangement to make use of such resources. 
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However, multiteam systems face many challenges due to their complexity, particularly 
regarding leadership (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). Multiteam systems are, by design, 
collective leadership structures. How the team leaders in a multiteam system coordinate 
activities has been identified as a key leadership challenge (Mathieu et al., 2001). We need to 
understand how this coordination is structured and executed. In the case of subsea operations, 
Johannessen et al. (Johannessen, McArthur, & Jonassen, 2012) found that a superordinate 
leader, the shift supervisor, is dedicated primarily to coordinating the execution of detailed 
Task Plans – a highly demanding role that requires focused attention. The Shift Supervisor is 
legally and practically confined to his control room for the execution phase of the operation, 
which can limit his awareness of events that might disrupt the operation. When disruptive 
events occur that the shift supervisor cannot attend to, other individuals step in to help. The 
ability of these individuals to act when needed constitutes a potential resource for the 
multiteam system - a kind of leadership redundancy. While this form of redundancy may 
enable the system to respond flexibly to changing demands, it may create unintended 
consequences by adding complexity and the potential for conflict.  
Our study aims to shed light on two questions: 
1. Can informal leadership redundancy be verified as one of several ways that the 
multiteam systems in our context handle unanticipated disturbances? 
2. If verified, what can we learn about the conditions under which it may be effective?   
Our research confirms the first question. To our knowledge, this has not been documented by 
previous research on multiteam systems. In addition, informal leadership redundancy adds to 
related types of distributed leadership (e.g. ‘deference to expertise’) in extant research on 
HROs. Finally, our research design also addresses a call for studying ‘micro-level 
interactions’ (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009) in the context of high-risk operations (Hannah, Uhl-
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Bien, Avolio, & Cavarretta, 2009), to better understand how high-reliability organizations 
respond flexibly to disruptive events in daily practice. Since such events come at 
unpredictable intervals, they can be difficult to study. We use a two-tier model, which 
includes field observations of a few such events that we then test with a larger number of 
informants. This methodology allows us to verify the existence of informal leadership 
redundancy, and assert that what we observed in the field actually constitutes a pattern. 
Finally, the interviews also allow us to explore the conditions that enable this kind of 
redundancy to be effective in a highly proceduralized environment. We begin our discussion 
by briefly reviewing the research on slack and redundancy in HROs. 
Slack	  as	  a	  Managerial	  Resource6	  
In her classic study of nuclear powered aircraft carriers, Roberts (Roberts 1990) found many 
types of slack, such as duplication of equipment, overlapping tasks, data stored in multiple 
places, and multiple people involved in critical operations. Having multiple people involved 
in an operation, Roberts argued (1990, p. 168), increases the likelihood that weak signals of 
failure will be noticed in the heat of the moment and is used  “(...) to decompose the tight time 
frames that are a part of tight coupling. If things are done quickly, but many pairs of eyes 
serve as watchdogs, the many pairs of eyes are a substitute for unavailable time. In a short 
time three pairs of eyes should be able to spot a problem that may take one pair of eyes longer 
to detect”. At the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Schulman (Schulman 1993) identified three 
broad categories of slack: resource slack (time, money and personnel), conceptual slack 
(diverging perspectives, theories, and models) and control slack (decision discretion and 
decentralized authority). He concluded that slack, rather than being a source of inefficiency, 
‘is a critical, if under-appreciated, managerial resource’ (Schulman,1993, p. 353). At the level 
of organizational culture, Weick et al. (1999) have described diversity and institutionalized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 We have borrowed the expression from Paul Schulman (Schulman 1993). 
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skepticism as a form of redundancy that “(...) involves cross checks, doubts that precautions 
are sufficient, and wariness about claimed levels of competence” (Weick et al., 1999).	  More 
recently, researchers have investigated how various forms of slack impact organizational 
flexibility, such as budgetary slack (Davila & Wouters, 2005), personnel redundancy in 
hospital trauma teams (Klein,	  Ziegert,	  Knight	  and	  Xiao,	  2006), and redundant task 
knowledge in emergency response organizations (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011).  
 
Given our focus on informal leadership redundancy, we are particularly interested in how 
reliability-seeking organizations distribute authority, thereby creating and utilizing all three 
forms of slack (resource, control and conceptual), identified by Schulman. For example, at the 
Diablo plant, Schulman found that there were multiple departments and committees 
responsible for ensuring safety, each with veto power over the other, which created a 
‘balanced, even fractionalization of administrative authority’ (Schulman 1993, p. 355). In 
another example, in a study of hospital trauma teams, Klein et al. (2006) found that the 
redundancy provided by skilled nurses allowed senior physicians to delegate decision making 
fluidly and rapidly to more junior physicians, a process they refer to as dynamic delegation. 
This form of structured and flexible decision making authority enabled the trauma units to 
achieve two primary goals - saving lives, as well as professional development.  
 
The form of distributed leadership that has perhaps received the most attention in the 
literature on HROs is known as deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). This is the 
process by which authority can migrate to an individual with the most relevant situational 
expertise, regardless of rank. Deference to expertise has been shown to enable flexible 
coordination and decision-making. Studies of aircraft carriers (Roberts 1990; Roberts, Stout, 
& Halpern, 1994), emergency response organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001), and pediatric 
	   8	  
Intensive Care Units (Roberts, Bea, & Bartles, 2001) have all found that authority can migrate 
across organizational boundaries, outside the formal chain of command, from those who are 
formally in charge, to those with the most relevant expertise to address a local problem. For 
example, Bigley and Roberts (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) quote an engine company captain on 
the importance of authority migration in an Incident Command System - a hierarchical, yet 
flexible, emergency response organization: “As a manager, it is really incumbent on me to 
recognize my weakness [in a particular area], and that I don't have as much knowledge as 
maybe a guy standing here next to me. Maybe I've got one of the premier national USR 
[urban search and rescue] truck captains standing next to me, and this guy knows it like bread 
and butter. So I'd be a much better manager, and I'd basically build the trust of people better, 
if I said, ‘Okay, here's what the over-all goal in this incident is: to get this truck off this guy. 
Okay? And Bob over here on Truck 45, or whatever, is the one that's going to basically direct 
the point-by-point operation of this.’ ” (Bigley & Roberts, 2001, p. 1288). 
 
While redundancy in its many forms can enable high-risk organizations to operate safely and 
reliably, it has also been criticized for adding expense, complexity, ambiguity, and a false 
sense of security (Rijpma 1997; Sagan 1994, Perrow 1999a). Regarding the limitations of 
distributed leadership in HROs, Barton and Sutcliffe (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009) have 
identified a potentially problematic aspect of deference to expertise. In a study of teams that 
fight wildfires, they found that most successful firefighting events involved a re-evaluation 
and change in strategy. This suggested that the ability to change a set course (to ‘interrupt a 
dysfunctional momentum’) was a critical capability for these teams. By focusing on ‘micro-
level interactions’ - interviewing firefighters in detail about their actions in successful and 
unsuccessful events - they found that firefighters sometimes assumed that someone with 
general expertise and authority had adequate knowledge of the current situation when, in fact, 
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they did not. Consequently, firefighters would question their own hunches and insight, 
withhold their concerns, and allow themselves to be led into an ineffective course of action. 
Similar dynamics have been found in airline crashes, where co-pilots defer to the expertise of 
the pilot and give only subtle warnings about impending danger (Fischer & Orasanu, 1999). 
Barton and Sutcliffe found that two key mindsets were critical in order for actors to interrupt a 
dysfunctional momentum: skepticism of expertise, (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 1341), which 
leads individuals to voice concerns about the current course of action, and situated humility ( 
Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 1344), which leads them to seek alternative points of view. Both 
mindsets enable deference to expertise to operate as an effective form of distributed 
leadership.  
 
Focusing on how slack can be put to productive use, several studies of HROs have found that 
improvisation is a key element of organizational flexibility, and that redundancy can enable 
improvisation. For example, in a comparative study of SWAT teams and film crews, Bechky 
and Okhuysen (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011) found that team members engage in 
‘organizational bricolage’ - a form of improvised action in which team members cope with 
unanticipated problems by piecing together whatever material, cognitive and social resources 
are on hand. Members of these teams are able to quickly shift roles and responsibilities 
because they have redundant task knowledge - shared mindsets and knowledge of each 
others’ roles based on either past job experience, or rigorous cross-training. In their study of 
Incident Command Systems (ICS), an organizational structure for responding to emergency 
situations, Bigley and Roberts found that members “appear able to structure and restructure 
themselves on a moment-to-moment basis” (Bigley & Roberts, 2001, pp. 1282), by engaging 
in both pre-planned and improvised actions. Bigley and Roberts underscore that, to be 
effective, improvisation must take place within constraints. Supervisors allow subordinates to 
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improvise (either in the use of tools, the application of rules, or the execution of procedures) 
as long as they have sufficient experience, take actions that are consistent with the overall 
goals and strategies of the ICS, and do not increase risk to members. If these conditions are 
not met, such actions are considered ‘freelancing,’ and found unacceptable by ICS members 
(Bigley & Roberts, 2001, p. 1289).  
 
To summarize, in this paper we examine how the balance of structure and flexibility takes 
place in practice in a high reliability seeking organization – a multiteam system that conducts 
subsea operations on the Norwegian continental shelf. While redundancy (or slack) in many 
forms has been identified as a key factor in maintaining this balance, we focus narrowly on 
one form of distributed leadership, which we refer to as leadership redundancy. 	  While formal 
leadership redundancy is well known (e.g. pilot and co-pilot), we focus on informal leadership 
redundancy, which, to our knowledge, has received less attention in the literature. Previous 
research on HROs has identified a form of distributed authority known as deference to 
expertise in which authority is delegated – most typically down the chain of command - to 
those who are closest to and most familiar with the issue at hand.  	  
In the current research we use a combination of field observation and interviews to study 
micro-interactions in which individuals interrupt a dysfunctional momentum (Barton & 
Sutcliffe, 2009). We found a dynamic of distributed authority that differs from deference to 
expertise, in that it is not delegated. Given the lack of delegation, our data suggest that for 
informal leadership redundancy to be an effective resource three conditions must be met: 
individuals must be available to act, willing to act, and their actions must be accepted by 
others. In our research context, certain individuals are available to act given slack in their 
roles. They are willing to act given their sense of responsibility for operational safety, their 
status and experience, and the quality of trust and respect in their working relationships. 
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When individuals step in for the shift supervisor, they are improvising outside of established 
procedures, but their interventions take place within constraints. Whether others accept their 
actions depends on whether there is a shared understanding of the boundaries of these 
constraints. We found that there was variance among our informants in how they perceived 
these constraints, which suggests that while informal leadership redundancy can add 
flexibility to the system’s ability to cope with surprise, it can also add the potential for 
conflict. Below we describe our research context and methodology, and present the data that 
illustrate our findings.   
Research	  Context	  and	  Method	  
The subsea infrastructure off Norway’s coast is the world’s largest, and connects offshore oil 
and gas fields with the UK, continental Europe and Norway. This infrastructure requires 
inspection, maintenance, and repair known as IMR operations. The operations in our study are 
performed from specialized vessels7. An IMR vessel is a high-tech environment with state-of-
the-art safety measures. Some 70 crewmembers are on board for a typical two-week trip, 
during which several operations may be carried out. A complex set of planning processes and 
quality checks lead up to the work on the installation. A Task Plan is created that describes 
the discrete steps in the execution of a single operation8. 
 
Each IMR campaign (a series of trips and operations) is a collaboration between four (or 
more) companies involving up to seven on-board teams on one trip. Oil companies hire the 
subsea contractor who specializes in subsea operations. The subsea contractor hires a 
specialized vessel with captain and crew from a shipping company. This is reflected in the on-
board organization of the IMR vessels. The client rep is the liaison for the oil company that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 IMR operations can also be performed from rigs, but the introduction of specialized vessels radically reduced the cost. 
8 Johannessen, I. A.  Review of IMR Operations, manuscript (unpublished). 
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has commissioned the work, the offshore manager leads the operational personnel, and the 
captain leads the marine crews and is responsible for safety. 
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Figure 1: An IMR vessel in dynamic positioning mode 
 
When the IMR vessel reaches its destination it switches to dynamic positioning (“DP”) mode. 
This technology fixes the vessel’s position, so that the remotely controlled robotic vessels 
(ROVs) and tools can be lowered to begin work (see Figure 1). Simultaneously, the 
individuals and component teams (across companies) that are directly engaged in the 
execution phase of the operation are put under the direct command of a single leader, the shift 
supervisor. Such integration of several teams to execute a superordinate goal has been 
	  14	  
described as a multiteam system (Mathieu et al., 2001). This transformation creates tight 
coupling between the interdependent component teams. The shift supervisor is primarily 
confined to his control room, and monitors the minute-to-minute operation on monitors.  
Coordinating the interdependent teams that conduct the operations takes up most of the shift 
supervisor’s time and attention (Johannessen, McArthur, & Jonassen, 2012)9.  
 
The ROV team is the core of the operation. From their control room, pairs of pilots ‘fly’ the 
robotic vehicles using mechanical arms (‘manipulators’) to perform work on subsea 
installations. Two or more pairs can work at the same time, lead by an ROV supervisor. 
While the pilots enjoy the safety and comfort of their control room, mistakes on their part can 
do damage and even jeopardize the operations. The work of the deck team is challenging in 
different ways. Over the deck, tower crane operators control large cranes. On deck, a deck 
foreman leads deck hands that perform multiple tasks (including operating smaller cranes). 
ROVs and other objects are lifted or lowered over the railing or through openings in the 
vessel’s hull (‘moon pools’). This busy and noisy place is physically the most dangerous on 
the vessel.  
 
Despite comprehensive planning, unforeseen and disruptive events do occur. In such cases, 
the shift supervisor or others may put the operation on hold (an ‘All Stop’). However, during 
our field study, we observed several situations where disruptions were contained without 
interrupting the operation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Johannessen, I. A. Review of IMR Operations, manuscript (unpublished). 
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The	  informal	  leadership	  redundancy	  hypothesis	  The	  findings	  in	  this	  study	  are	  based	  on	  both	  field	  data	  collected	  in	  2009,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  stimulus	  case	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  2011.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  field	  trip	  was	  to	  familiarize	  our	  team	  with	  the	  research	  context,	  and	  to	  develop	  focused	  research	  questions.	  One	  result	  was	  the	  development	  of	  our	  hypothesis	  on	  leadership	  redundancy	  (	  Johannessen,	  McArthur,	  &	  Jonassen,	  2012). 
Table 1: Field Trip data and follow-up interviews 
 
Our analysis of the field data was informed primarily by high reliability theory (Weick et al., 
1999), which has advocated that reliable operations require both structure and flexibility 
(Faraj & Xiao, 2006), and has articulated a set of principles that increase an organization’s 
capacity to contain unexpected events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). In light of this, it made 
sense to look more closely at the execution phase of IMR operations where the system’s tight 
coupling is put under the highest stress (Perrow 1999b).  
 
Field Trip Data (2009) Follow-Up Interviews (2011) Designed	  to	  familiarize	  researchers	  with	  the	  case,	  and	  develop	  focused	  research	  questions. Designed	  to	  validate	  and	  explore	  further	  how	  the	  on-­‐board	  organization	  can	  respond	  flexibly	  to	  unexpected	  events. 
Collected on a two-week trip on a subsea vessel Conducted on visits to vessels on port calls 
14 semi-structured interviews 35 stimulus case interviews 
16 unstructured interviews 7	  shifts	  on	  4	  vessels 
138 hours of observation  
(5 background interviews were carried out on-shore 
prior to the field trip) 
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The field study had familiarized us with the key role of the shift supervisor in the execution 
phase. We learned that he needed to remain on his post in his control room and that he 
seemed to prioritize task coordination during the execution phase, a key leadership function 
identified by multiteam systems theory (Mathieu et al., 2001). This insight led us to look into 
how functional team leadership frameworks (Morgeson et al., 2010) have been applied to 
understand team dynamics. Functional leadership theory focuses on the ‘what’ rather than the 
‘who’ or ‘how’ of leadership. Seen through this lens, the shift supervisor’s primary leadership 
function is task coordination. We asked ourselves how other leadership functions under the 
purview of the shift supervisor were accommodated (or not) when events occurred that could 
disrupt the operation. 
 
We searched our field data (organized in an NVivo data base) for examples of the kinds of 
events that the shift supervisor was either unaware of, or unable to respond to given his focus 
on task coordination, and recorded how they were managed. We found that other individuals 
stepped in, unasked, to manage the situation, sometimes improvising outside standard 
procedures. The actions taken by these individuals were consistent with a subset of leadership 
tasks identified by functional leadership theory (Morgeson et al., 2010), such as boundary 
management, problem solving, and coaching.  
 
To test our hypothesis that informal leadership redundancy contributes to the system’s ability 
to balance structure and flexibility, and to understand how this occurs in practice, we 
extended our case study to include interviews with new informants, using stimulus cases 
based on our field observations.   
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Purpose	  and	  design	  of	  stimulus	  case	  interviews	  
The concept of informal leadership redundancy is difficult to study systematically. Where and 
when disruptive events are likely to occur is unpredictable, and we had a relatively low 
number of examples from the field study. But, as Flyvbjerg has pointed out, ‘atypical and 
extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more 
basic mechanisms in the situation studied’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 306), and such cases can make 
new sense of events that were considered outliers. In our case, we seem to have identified a 
dynamic that gave the system a greater capacity for flexible response, which, to our 
knowledge, had not been described in previous research. We could not be sure if what we had 
observed in the field were isolated examples (a verification issue), and we had limited 
information about the conditions for successful use of informal leadership redundancy (an 
issue that called for further exploration). Our specific contribution to extant HRO theory is in 
an early stage of development, which also indicated that a case study could be the most 
effective research strategy (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). We looked for ways to extend 
the initial field study to examine the same type of subsea operations, collecting new data 
while keeping variance of contextual factors low (Flyvbjerg 2011). 
 
Given we could not afford new and longer periods of observation, we needed a more efficient 
way of gathering data. We drew on a variant of critical incidents techniques used in studies of 
education (Angelides 2001), which we combined with our own experiences in designing 
leadership training programs (Johannessen, McArthur, Jonassen, & Leirbaek, 2013).  
 
We designed a set of stimulus cases based on examples of informal leadership redundancy 
from our field data, all taken from the busy execution phase of the operations. We used these 
cases as the basis for semi-structured interviews. In order to ensure that the stimulus cases 
were clearly written and did not contain any misunderstandings of subsea operations, we 
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sought input from business insiders, both in individual conversations and in a seminar. New 
subjects read the cases and were asked if they recognized the examples, whether they 
evaluated the intervention as appropriate or not, and the reason for their evaluation. The cases 
were tested on one vessel on a port call in June 2011. One ambiguous case was replaced, and 
minor clarifications were made to the others. Findings from three of the cases are included in 
the present article10. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The fourth case concerned boundary management. That leadership function was already represented in case #1, so the fourth case was left 
out in the present article to save space. 
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Table	  2:	  The	  Stimulus	  Cases11 
Data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  
In line with the strategy for extending the case study, we selected contexts (vessels and shifts) 
from the same type of subsea operations as in the field study, with a similar mix of 
companies, similar arrangements for leadership and inter-organizational cooperation, all 
under the same (Norwegian) regulatory regime. From June to December 2011 two researchers 
conducted interviews on IMR vessels during port calls. We selected subjects that were all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In this version, we have substituted some technical terms with more generic terms to make it easier for readers unfamiliar with the 
business. The substitutes are in parentheses. 
Case	  #	  1 
During an operation to recover (a tool from the sea bed), there is a sudden leak of hydraulic oil from 
a manipulator on one of the ROVs. Oil spills directly into the sea under (high pressure). 
 
The client rep, the third party experts and the senior ROV supervisor are present in the ROV control 
room. The offshore manager has just arrived. The shift supervisor is in the adjacent control room, 
busy containing the damage while keeping the operation in motion. 
 
The client rep starts a discussion about why and how the incident could happen. He uses a critical 
tone and tries to engage the pilots in a discussion. The offshore manager interrupts the conversation, 
and quickly guides the group away to a different room to continue there, leaving the pilots behind to 
go on with their work. Two pilots continue working with the intact ROV while the other pilot team 
recovers the leaking ROV to the surface for repairs.  
 
Case	  #2 
A client rep gives an example of when they became aware of an unresolved problem in an upcoming 
operation.  It concerned (a broken tool). He commented: “Strictly speaking, it is the shift supervisor’s 
responsibility to anticipate challenges and make sure that the work moves smoothly from one 
operation into the next. But we all need to be able to step in when necessary”.  
 
The client rep and the offshore manager sat and talked about how they could solve it.  They made 
some sketches, puzzled over it, walked around the departments, and after 1 hour and 20 minutes they 
had a solution.  After the initial discussion the client rep then went to the project engineer and 
proposed the solution.  The engineer considered the technical aspects and performed detailed 
calculations to make sure it was feasible. Then the client rep and the engineer went to the tower crane 
operator and modified the solution, and finally took it to the offshore manager for approval.  When 
that was granted, the engineer worked out a task plan for the operation.  From the time they started 
working on the idea until the (tool) lay on the deck took 8 hours. 
Case	  #3 
The medic has time to walk around and have informal contact with people, and is more likely that 
many others to pick up early signals of problems and needs. He notices the new deck foreman talking 
with his two (deck hands). The (deck hands) are new; the medic has not seen them before. The deck 
foreman walks over to a small crane and begins to operate it, while several other operations are in 
progress on deck. It strikes the medic as odd that the (deck hands) are left standing idly behind. 
 
Over several days, he notices a pattern, and gets concerned. The deck foreman does not seem to fill 
some of his leadership role; of keeping an overview, having an eye on safety, delegating duties, and 
coaching the new (deck hands) when needed. The medic decides to see if the deck foreman may be 
open to some feedback and advice himself, and asks to talk with him in private when he is off-duty. 
The deck foreman turns out to appreciate this opportunity to talk to someone about his work. 	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involved (directly or indirectly) in the execution phase of the operations, and who were in a 
role that would have information12 on one or several of the examples of informal leadership 
redundancy that we had observed in the field study. 
 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. A log was created to keep track of 
who was interviewed, and the circumstances around each port call. In December 2011 a 
sample of the interviews was discussed amongst the authors, and a procedure for validation 
and analysis was developed.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Our educated guesses of who possessed relevant information proved right in most cases. The exception was that we also interviewed 
captains who all explained that they were too far removed from the execution of the operations to have insight in our examples. These 
interviews were therefore excluded from the analysis.  
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Table 3: Informants by role and affiliations 
Role Affiliation Informants Description Client	  Representative Oil	  Company	  (The	  Operator) 6 A	  client	  rep	  represents	  the	  oil	  company	  (the	  ‘Client’).	  He	  monitors	  the	  ongoing	  work	  on	  the	  vessel. Offshore	  Manager Subsea	  Contractor 4 The	  offshore	  manager	  is	  the	  highest-­‐ranking	  officer	  of	  the	  operator	  company	  on	  the	  vessel. 
Project	  Engineer	   Subsea	  Contractor 5 The	  project	  engineer	  is	  an	  aide	  to	  the	  offshore	  manager	  and	  helps	  translate	  overarching	  plans	  into	  practical	  detail. Medic Subsea	  Contractor/	  Shipping	  Company 
6 The	  medic	  is	  on-­‐call	  when	  first	  aid	  is	  needed	  (infrequently)	  and	  assists	  the	  offshore	  manager	  in	  matters	  of	  health,	  safety	  and	  environment. 
Shift	  Supervisor	   Subsea	  Contractor 8 The	  shift	  supervisor	  directly	  controls	  and	  coordinates	  all	  resources	  in	  the	  execution	  phase	  of	  an	  operation. ROV	  Supervisor	   Subsea	  Contractor 5 The	  ROV	  supervisor	  leads	  the	  team	  of	  pilots	  that	  ‘fly’	  the	  subsea,	  remotely	  controlled	  robots	  (the	  ROVs) Deck	  Foreman	   Subsea	  Contractor 1 The	  deck	  foreman	  leads	  and	  coordinates	  the	  operational	  work	  on	  deck	  (where	  immediate	  physical	  hazards	  are	  highest). SUM  35  
	  
 	  
A template was created to summarize each researcher’s individual analysis of the informants’ 
responses to the cases in each interview (see Appendix). The template was designed to keep 
track of 1) whether subjects could confirm or disconfirm if they recognized the behavior 
described in the case and 2) how subjects evaluated and made sense of the behavior in each 
case.  
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Each researcher scored if informants had participated in or witnessed interventions like the 
ones described in the cases, and, if not, if they saw them as plausible or implausible. 
Similarly, each researcher scored the evaluation in the interview as positive, negative or 
undecided, and identified the relevant quotes in each interview. Each interview was analyzed 
by a minimum of two researchers, who met for validation meetings. For the validation 
meetings, a tailor-made Bento13 database was created, in which scores, notes and quotes were 
stored. If there was disagreement between the scores and a closer look at the data could not 
lead to reconciliation, the ‘strictest’ interpretation was chosen. In the case of 
confirmation/disconfirmation, the disconfirming alternative was chosen. In the case of the 
evaluation, doubtful scores were recorded as undecided. We conducted a total of eight 
validation meetings. Finally, a summary document of relevant findings was created, and 
checked for accuracy14. 
 
These inquiries have enabled us to: 1) validate if subjects on other vessels and shifts could 
recognize the triggering events and the interventions we had observed in the field study; and 
2) explore how and under what conditions informal leadership redundancy worked. We report 
our findings in the following section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bento is a simple data base tool from FileMaker. 
14 Details of the methodology are recorded in a separate report (Johannessen et al., 2013). 
	  23	  
Findings	  
The stimulus cases are based on events that were observed in the field. In each event an 
individual took initiative on their own to resolve a problem that was officially under the 
purview of the shift supervisor, but which the shift supervisor could not address at that 
moment, given his other priorities. In the actual examples on which the scenarios are based, 
each case was resolved successfully in that the disruptive event was contained, and in a way 
that did not create unintended consequences.  
 
The first step in our analysis was to establish if our subjects recognized the case scenarios as 
realistic triggering events (i.e., that an insider would see as a problem that would require an 
intervention). We also needed to check whether our informants saw the events as outside the 
‘interventionists’ formal role and within the shift supervisor’s purview. The second, more 
explorative step was to determine under what conditions (enabling factors) our informants 
would see the intervention itself (as described in the case scenario) as realistic and effective. 
Realism	  of	  the	  Stimulus	  Cases	  
The majority of informants confirmed, regardless of their role, that the situations described in 
the stimulus cases were realistic, and would pose a risk to the safety and success of the 
operation: technical breakdowns needing immediate, undivided attention can occur during 
operations (Case #1); assumptions that underlie the Task Plan do not always match the 
realities at the site, and gaps must be corrected quickly (Case #2); and ineffective delegation 
can jeopardize the safety or effectiveness of the operation (Case #3).   
 
Informants also confirmed that the individuals who intervened in each case were not doing so 
as part of their formal responsibilities. Each of the situations fall under the purview of the 
shift supervisor who may be unable to respond in the moment given the constraints of his 
role. For example, one shift supervisor (08) said that “90% of the time” he would prevent any 
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disturbances to the ROV teams, like the one illustrated in Case #1. However, as medic 06 
commented, the shift supervisor may be unable to do so if he must focus his attention on the 
recovery of the ROV. “Technically, the shift supervisor should probably have drawn the line 
(...) and moved [the client rep] away from the situation (…). However, the shift supervisor is 
probably [more concerned with what is going on in front of him].” 
 
Regarding problems with the Task Plan (Case #2), client rep 09 said, “The shift supervisor 
has his hands full with the operation. He can’t sit down to solve such a problem.” Another 
client rep (04) commented that, “(…) it is a fact that, if you are very focused on a task, your 
vision can get quite narrow, and you may not notice the obstacle outside your visual range. 
But those sitting a bit on the sideline of the operation may notice it.” Or, as a shift supervisor 
(07) said, “Sometimes the shift supervisor has already moved from the deck (…) They’re not 
always on deck to see everything; whereas you’ve got deck foremen, riggers, engineers, and 
so on, who hopefully catch it before that, which does happen on lots of occasions.” Finally, 
regarding problems with the deck crews (Case #3), one shift supervisor (06) said about his 
potential inability to intervene, “(…) I have no way of picking up on this situation. I can, of 
course, see them on deck when I am working with the camera, but I am paying attention to 
other things also. So, it is not certain that I can see the situation for what it is.” 
To summarize, our subjects recognized the case scenarios as events that might occur and that 
might call for an intervention. They also described the interventionists in the examples as 
stepping out of their ordinary role in performing the intervention, and that the leadership 
function in question was normally under the purview of the shift supervisor. 
Enabling	  Factors	  
Below we present the factors that our informants suggest influence the effective use of slack 
leadership resources. As we reviewed the transcripts, we found that informants’ responses fell 
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into three categories; 1) the availability of an individual to take action, 2) the willingness of 
that individual to act, and 3) whether the intervention was likely to be accepted and why. 
Below, we illustrate each of these elements.  
Availability	  to	  intervene	  	  
Medic 01 commented that while the shift supervisor should have prevented the client rep from 
disturbing the ROV pilots, “the offshore manager is probably more able to get an overall 
impression, just take a step back, and let [the pilots] deal with [the recovery of the ROV, and] 
take [the client rep] aside”. Similarly, in Case #3, where the medic provides coaching to the 
deck foreman, several people commented that the medic’s role enables him to have the time 
to walk around and observe, and “be a researcher of sorts (project engineer 10).” In Case #2, a 
shift supervisor (07) commented that the client rep could be a useful resource because his 
formal role, unlike the shift supervisor on duty, gave him some distance on the situation: “Say 
you are working on a jigsaw puzzle. When you are that close to the jigsaw puzzle, you can’t 
see all the pieces. You can’t see the ones over there.  If you’ve just come into the room, you 
can say, ‘Hey you are missing a piece. It’s over there.’  It’s as simple as that”. All of these 
examples suggest that slack in one’s formal role may provide an opportunity for heightened 
awareness and capacity to consider what may be needed, and what can be done. However, 
previous research on HROs (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009) has argued that awareness alone is not 
enough to contain disruptive events. People must also be willing to take action.  
 
Willingness	  to	  intervene	  
Informants said they were motivated by a sense of responsibility for the safety and 
effectiveness of the operations. Client rep (06), reflecting on Case #2, said that it was “(…) 
out of the question that I, as the client on board, would sit down and wait for the problem to 
emerge when I had noticed it.” shift supervisor 07, reflecting on the same case, said that 
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during an operation, “(…) if something crops up (…) it’s up to the people who see it, or who 
can sort that problem out.” 
 
Informants also said that their willingness to act could be influenced by the status of their role 
and their degree of experience. For example, project engineer 10 commented that if a shift 
supervisor is not able to maintain the boundary around the pilot team so they can work 
undisturbed, “(…) the offshore manager runs things, so it is easiest for him to put his foot 
down.” ROV supervisor 07 added, “If the offshore manager is around, he would 
automatically take the initiative. If he is not, then I would, if I were there, politely give [the 
client rep] feedback (…), if I am not there, then it is guaranteed that the assistant ROV 
supervisor or the pilots would draw the line, they are so confident.”15 Other informants 
qualified this by saying that it would take some gravitas (Norwegian: ‘pondus’) to confront a 
client rep, (“typical trainees would not do this” (project engineer 10)) or to complain about a 
leader. 
 
Our informants also indicated that the willingness to intervene depends on trust and respect in 
their work relationships, and that such qualities may need deliberate cultivation. For example, 
shift supervisor 07 commented that when problems occur on deck that the shift supervisor is 
unaware of, “(…) hopefully, the deck foreman has a good enough working relationship with 
the shift supervisor to go and say, ‘Look we’re going to have a problem with this’.” Another 
shift supervisor (03) also stressed the importance of the same relationship: “In my experience, 
when you come to a new place, one of the first that I get in touch with and try to get to know 
is the deck foreman, for he is my eyes and ears on (…) deck. And that relationship needs to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The confidence of the pilots may be partly influenced by the status of their role and the fact that their salaries are among the highest on 
board. 
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built on mutual respect.” Client rep 04, talking about his own willingness to raise issues, 
commented, “I may have asked about stuff with the wrong person and been told that that was 
maybe [inappropriate], and I think that is OK. But then maybe you ask again and you reach an 
agreement, and it is no big deal, because you develop flexibility by being flexible yourself. It 
is give and take the whole way.” Client rep 04 suggested that some amount of trial and error 
must to be tolerated, and, that being criticized for mistakes also must be tolerated. 
 
To summarize: For some informants, willingness to intervene seems to be grounded in a sense 
of shared responsibility for the safe and effective execution of the operations. While it may be 
easier for individuals with experience and high status to voice their concerns, similar 
initiatives from less experienced, junior people are also considered possible. Flexibility, trust 
and respect can be developed when members of multiteam systems negotiate the boundaries 
of an acceptable improvisation.  
Acceptance	  of	  the	  intervention	  
The interventions in the actual situations on which the case scenarios are based were effective 
in that they 1) solved the perceived problem that triggered the intervention, and 2) did not 
create unintended side effects, such as confusion or conflict. The semi-experimental stimulus 
case interviews cannot robustly test the effectiveness of interventions in the first sense, but 
they provide insight into how controversial the interventions might be.  
 
According to our informants, the strongest criteria for accepting an intervention are the degree 
and urgency of risk to the operation. The consensus was that immediate risk called for 
immediate action, and, if necessary, an ‘All Stop’16. For example, in Case #1, informants 
agreed that the offshore manager (or anyone regardless of rank or role) would be right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The general mandate to call a halt to an operation if perceiving danger, see page 12. 
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intervene with the disruptive client rep in order to allow the ROV pilots to work undisturbed. 
In cases of imminent danger there was agreement that anyone had the right, if not an 
obligation, to completely stop the operation. This concern for safety was relevant to how 
some informants reacted to the medic’s intervention with the deck foreman in Case #3. For 
example, ROV supervisor 07 said that if the medic observed something that posed an 
imminent danger, and, “(…) if it was a very critical operation he should have interrupted right 
there and then.” Or, as offshore manager 06 commented, “ (…) if [the medic] sensed that this 
would jeopardize safety, meaning that people were not in full control of the deck, (…) I need 
to know that. We can’t have that.”  
 
In situations that did not pose an immediate threat to safety, informants’ evaluations of the 
cases were influenced by three factors: how procedures, and the chain of command are taken 
into account, and if the interventionist has the appropriate skills. For example, in reference to 
following procedures, shift supervisor 07 said, “I try not to deviate from what is written down. 
If it is not written down, then I’ll want confirmation from somebody else before I will deviate 
from that path. I’m not going to deviate from what I am supposed to be doing, especially in 
this industry, because then it opens up a whole new can of worms.” An offshore manager (05) 
seconded the importance of following a structured approach to change when he said, “(…) so 
we're trying to agree ahead of time, we'll have this and this policy, if there are to be changes, 
we want it in writing. And if [the client rep] comes and asks for changes we'll say, ok, we 
can't start doing things outside the procedure that we have established here. If so, we need to 
sit down and create a new procedure. (...) this [is something that] goes on the whole time - 
how flexible we want to be and what we let happen (offshore manager 05).” Or, finally, as 
client rep 07 said, “If I have an idea I will vent it, (…) ‘Can we do this? Can we try that?’ But 
everything here is guided [by] procedures, as well. So, in order to deviate from the 
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procedures, we call an ‘All Stop’ and discuss what we want to do. We do the risk assessment, 
and then we do the Management of Change17. Once it’s all agreed and approved by everybody 
on board, and depending on the type of change we have, it either goes onshore or not. After 
that, we continue the work in a new way that is set in stone.”   
 
Several informants expressed a concern related to procedural discipline - respect for the chain 
of command. For example, regarding Case #3, one shift supervisor commented, “It is a good 
thing that the medic observes. That’s his job, and he is an HSE advisor, so that is only 
positive. But, I don’t think that it is right that he goes straight to the deck foreman to talk with 
him about how he does his job. It would have been more appropriate to come and talk with us 
who are responsible for the deck. Either talk to me or to the offshore manager if he has a 
concern.” All of the medics that we interviewed also said that respecting the chain of 
command was important, and that if they were to give feedback to a deck foreman they would 
also include the deck foreman’s supervisor. 
 
Finally, some informants indicated that how they perceived an individual’s skill level could 
influence whether or not they accepted an intervention by that individual. In the case of the 
coaching intervention performed by the medic in Case #3, some thought that he lacked the 
sufficient technical skills to justify commenting on the deck foreman’s work performance. 
Others saw him as somebody, who, as an observer and aide, could intervene based on more 
generic coaching skills. As a shift supervisor argued, part of the medic’s mandate is to be, “an 
independent person who can go and speak to different people” on his own initiative with the 
potential to “raise [his concern about the deck foreman privately] and say what he has 
observed, and check if he has seen correctly” (project engineer 10).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The procedure to change a procedure, for example to create a new Task Plan. 
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Participants did not agree on how the criteria of acceptance applied to the examples in the 
stimulus cases. Their disagreements were based either on how they assessed the intervention 
against a particular criterion (e.g. loyalty to chain of command), or on which criteria they 
considered most relevant (e.g. chain of command vs. possessing a relevant skill).  As an 
example of the first, some informants thought that the client rep in Case #2 who made 
changes to the Task Plan had not followed proper procedure because he had not included the 
shift supervisor. As shift supervisor 10 commented, “No, this is all wrong. (...) The shift 
supervisor is supposed to get to read and comment on a task plan. That’s the [proper] process 
(…).” Other informants, however, thought that as long as the client rep involved the offshore 
manager and the project engineer he could take the lead in creating a solution. For example, 
one client rep (06) commented, “(…) he contacted the offshore manager to discuss it, and 
that’s the natural thing to do. These are the proper communication channels.” The latter 
comment suggests that the client rep does not deviate from proper procedure, but rather 
emulates that procedure by going through the same steps that the shift supervisor would have. 
 
To summarize, our interview data indicate that there is agreement on how slack leadership 
resources can take action when there is an imminent safety risk, or when the efficient and 
effective execution of an operation is clearly compromised. However, in situations that do not 
call for an ‘All Stop’ (which is costly in terms of time and money), but still require a flexible 
approach, informants had different views on what constitutes an acceptable improvisation. 
Our data indicate that creating alignment around how to achieve flexibility potentially 
involves two different negotiations: 1) how a particular criterion, such as command lines, or 
procedures, should apply in a given situation, and 2) which criterion is the most relevant in 
	  31	  
determining whether an action is acceptable or not - e.g., command lines, procedural 
guidelines, and necessary skills. 
Discussion	  
Research on HROs has claimed that these organizations are successful because they balance 
structure and flexibility (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Weick et al., 1999). The current study 
contributes to an understanding of how this balance takes place in practice by documenting a 
form of distributed leadership that we have named informal leadership redundancy. In the 
following sections we discuss our contribution in light of extant literature on authority 
migration, constrained improvisation, and the capacity for interrupting problematic courses of 
action. We then examine some ambiguities associated with informal leadership redundancy. 
In conclusion, we point out limitations in our study and potential for future research. 
Authority	  migration	  
Previous research on HROs has identified deference to expertise as a mechanism for 
migrating authority to those individuals with the most relevant knowledge and expertise in 
order to make quick and effective decisions. The individuals to whom authority migrates are 
executing tasks that are part of their formal role. Therefore, their availability and willingness 
to take action is ensured, and the acceptance of their actions by others is likely. Deference to 
expertise exists in IMR operations, as well. For example, authority migrates to the shift 
supervisor when the IMR vessel reaches the installation site and the execution phase begins. 
Authority also migrates to other individuals when their formal role requires them to make 
quick decisions. Like deference to expertise, informal leadership redundancy can add capacity 
for flexible response, but it is distinct from that principle; the formal leader does not delegate 
the tasks that others take on, even though these tasks concern functions that are usually 
associated with the leader’s position. The individuals that take action in our examples are 
available because of slack in their formal role during the execution of the operation, they 
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perceive a need that they believe they can address, and they then choose to intervene. 
Furthermore, unlike with deference to expertise, the key issue with informal leadership 
redundancy is whether others accept the improvised actions that are taken. Here, our findings 
contribute to research on HROs, which has found that improvisation is acceptable within 
constraints.  
Constrained	  improvisation	  	  
In the case scenarios, individuals chose to improvise outside their normal role. In this regard, 
the scenarios are consistent with Bechky and Okhuysen’s (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011) 
concept of role shifting as a form of organizational bricolage (making improvised use of 
available resources). For example, the client rep in Case #2 decides that he can and should 
take the lead in creating an alternative approach to the next phase of the operation, since 
conditions do not conform with the existing Task Plan. He temporarily fills a role that under 
other conditions would be filled by the shift supervisor. This illustrates how the 
‘interventionists’ in our research improvise in two ways: first, by taking initiative outside their 
formal responsibilities; and, second, by coming up with solutions that are not anticipated in 
plans and procedures.  
 
According to Bechky and Okhuysen (2011), organizational bricolage is possible when groups 
have shared task knowledge and common work flow expectations. Similar conditions are 
present in our research. On each trip, the whole crew goes through familiarization meetings to 
create the mindful attention to safety that they may need after 2-4 weeks off 18. In the same 
meetings, the upcoming operations are also outlined, so that all have a shared understanding 
of the work ahead. Crewmembers that have a direct role in the planning and execution of an 
operation are not only briefed, but are to varying degrees engaged in formulating and refining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 , Johannessen, I. A. Review of IMR Operations, manuscript (unpublished).. 
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the Task Plan. Many, if not all crewmembers will share an understanding of the nature of the 
operation, the expected sequence and, for the more experienced, a readiness for things that 
can go wrong.  
 
Our findings on improvisation in IMR operations are also consistent with those of Bigley and 
Roberts in their study of Incident Command Systems in that the improvisations are 
constrained - they both ‘spring from and tend to be limited by’ (Bigley & Roberts, 2001, p. 
1289) rules and procedures. For example, in case #2, when the client rep steps in and 
bypasses the shift supervisor, he emulates what the shift supervisor would have done if he had 
the time. He coordinates with the shift supervisor’s superior (the offshore manager) and 
involves the same people that the shift supervisor would in developing a new Task Plan. This 
is what leads some informants to see the intervention as appropriate, as if the client rep were 
following the spirit, if not the letter of the established procedures. Similarly, our informants 
accepted the improvised actions taken by the offshore manager, the client rep, or the medic, if 
they were seen as consistent with the purpose and goals of the operation. Those who objected 
to the interventions most often saw them as not respecting existing command lines and 
operating procedures. Those who defended the more controversial interventions argued that 
though unusual, they were still in compliance with goals, command lines and operating 
procedures. This respect for structure on the part of our informants appears to be a key factor 
that shapes how improvisation is perceived and enacted, even when informants had different 
interpretations of how these principles applied in a given situation.   
 
The kind of constrained improvisation we observe on the part of slack informal leadership 
resources in IMR operations differs in an important respect from what Bigley and Roberts 
found in an emergency response organization. Bigley and Roberts frame constrained 
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improvisation in terms of giving able subordinates freedom to adapt. They write, “When a 
commander believes subordinates possess sufficient experience, training, and resourcefulness 
to adapt to local conditions, he or she typically leaves the task partially unstructured (unless 
an unusual degree of directed coordination is required for some other reason). In other words, 
supervisors provide subordinates with a degree of latitude to improvise—that is, to activate 
and coordinate their own routines and to apply novel tactics to unexpected problems” (Bigley 
& Roberts, 2001, p. 1289). In each stimulus case in our study, tasks have not been left 
deliberately unstructured to provide subordinates the opportunity to exercise their own 
judgment. These interventions are of a different nature in that they are a response to an 
unexpected event, and have not been delegated. This makes constrained improvisation by 
informal, slack leadership resources more complex than improvisation within one’s formal 
role, and suggests that the individuals involved would need to have a shared understanding of 
how they interpret goals, operating procedures and command lines.  
Interrupting	  dysfunctional	  momentum	  
Our research also adds to recent work on the factors that contribute to this kind of 
improvisation. In their study of wildfire teams Barton and Sutcliffe (2009) showed that in 
most cases where fire fighting had been successful, the course of action had changed from the 
initial strategy. Somebody had become aware that following the initial strategy would 
constitute a dysfunctional momentum. Barton and Sutcliffe also demonstrated that awareness 
of a problem is not enough to trigger change; people must also voice their concern, in order to 
change a current course of action. In our research we also found that actors need to be aware 
of warning signs, and be willing to raise concerns. But, when they choose to take on a 
leadership function under the purview of the shift supervisor, they are not only raising a 
concern, they take action to address the problem. To do so, they need to see themselves as the 
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right person to intervene, as personally capable, and sufficiently involved to take 
responsibility.  
 
Since unexpected events at times fall outside any contingency plan, containing them requires 
novel initiatives. Informal leadership redundancy may provide the capacity needed for 
improvisation to occur - both in regard to who takes initiative, and how they address the 
problem. Implicitly, an interventionist makes a judgment that his action is relevant, necessary 
and appropriate. Since this is necessarily a private judgment, others may in fact disagree, and 
the exercise of informal leadership redundancy may be contested. Next, we look at the 
tensions that we found were associated with informal leadership redundancy.  
The	  ambiguities	  of	  informal	  leadership	  redundancy	  
The fact that even well planned operations can face unexpected events comes as no surprise to 
our informants. Several acknowledged that the unexpected situations that they faced in the 
operations could be ambiguous, without an obviously right response. All informants 
acknowledge that improvisation may be necessary to contain unanticipated events19. The open 
questions concern who to involve in specific decisions, and when and how to blend 
improvisation with following procedures. 
 
In their discussion of the Incident Command System, Bigley and Roberts (2001) identified 
‘freelancing’ as an inappropriate form of improvisation: an action that was not aligned with 
the overall goals of the ICS, or that might jeopardize safety. Our informants used similar 
criteria to assess whether the interventions in our stimulus cases were appropriate. Respect for 
procedures and lines of command are salient values both for those who favor the more 
controversial interventions in the stimulus cases and those who have doubts. Concerns for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 If the disturbance is so great that the operation must be put on hold, a procedure for changing procedures (Management of change) will be 
evoked and enacted. Here, we are more interested in those instances when adaptation happens by way of improvisation. 
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safety appear to override all other concerns in the evaluations. However, as the responses to 
Case #2 and Case #3 indicate, the benefit of implementing informal leadership redundancy is 
controversial. Informants did not always agree about which criteria were relevant in their 
assessment of a particular case, and even when they agreed on the evaluation criteria, they did 
not always agree on how to apply those criteria in a given situation. This suggests that 
informal leadership redundancy can be a resource that promotes flexibility, but also adds 
complexity if people are not aligned on when and how it should be implemented.  
 
Unexpected events will, by definition, always challenge a rule-bound and proceduralized 
organization (Weick 1993). As Barton and Sutcliffe found, responding effectively to surprise 
in order to interrupt a dysfunctional momentum requires certain mindsets. Skepticism of 
expertise (the attitude that no expertise is omniscient) enables people to raise concerns, and 
situated humility (the attitude that complex, dynamic situations may change and require new 
knowledge) enables people to actively seek out diverse perspectives. Our data suggest the 
inclusion of a third mindset, which also enables constrained improvisation – tolerance for 
ambiguity (Schulman 1993). Schulman has argued that a tolerance for ambiguity is essential 
for conceptual slack - the inclusion of diverse perspectives, which may help an organization 
handle the unexpected. Such tolerance may apply more widely, and also be relevant to the use 
of informal leadership redundancy (a form of resource slack and control slack as well as 
conceptual slack) in order to interrupt a dysfunctional momentum.  
 
In our interviews, we saw some evidence of tolerance for ambiguity. When informants 
commented on interventions that they had problems with, they did not attribute negative 
motives to the actor, and they weighed arguments for and against his actions. As shift 
supervisor 08 put it, when deciding whether to operate outside established procedures, “There 
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are lots of grey areas”. An offshore manager (06), asked how he would explain to a medic 
when it was okay for him to coach a deck foreman said, “That’s a little intricate and a good 
question”. Client rep 04, who reflected on his willingness to intervene, accepted the risk of 
making mistakes and standing corrected. These reactions indicate that the informants embrace 
the ambiguities in the operations as a reality that calls for negotiation, trial and error.  
Conclusion	  
 We have examined how individuals handled a set of disruptive events and identified how a 
reliability-seeking organization can respond flexibly to disruptive events through the use of 
redundant informal leadership resources. The focus and design of our study answers calls for 
research on reliability-seeking organizations to attend to both context (Hannah et al., 2009) 
and micro-level interactions (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). Our organizational context - subsea 
operations that inspect, repair, and maintain the oil and gas infrastructure on the Norwegian 
continental shelf - adds to the contexts studied in previous research on high reliability 
organizations.  
 
In informal leadership redundancy we have identified a mechanism for authority migration 
that differs from both deference to expertise and dynamic delegation. We found that it can add 
to a system’s capacity for flexible adaptation, but also to the potential for conflict. Our 
findings contribute to research on constrained improvisation (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) and to 
the factors that enable individuals to interrupt a dysfunctional momentum (Barton & Sutcliffe, 
2009; Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011). When we examined informants’ reactions to our examples, 
we found that they evaluated the improvisations based on an underlying respect for 
procedural discipline. In our examples, the ‘interventionist’ does not just notice a potential 
problem; they take action outside their normal role to solve it, and do so without explicit 
delegation. Everyone involved in the operation may not share an understanding of these 
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interventions, which can create the potential for conflict. However, experienced people in 
these systems also know that it may not be possible to reach consensus on the right course of 
action in the heat of the moment. This may lead to a tolerance for ambiguity that makes the 
use of informal leadership redundancy more acceptable and, therefore, more effective.  
Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  	  
The initial observational study was explorative, and took place on one vessel, with one crew. 
The follow-up interviews using stimulus cases were designed to extend the field observations 
to more crews and vessels with similar technology, tasks, multiteam structures, and regulatory 
constraints. As with all case studies, further research is needed to determine how our findings 
are generalizable to other contexts.   
	  
One of the unique structural features of IMR operations is that they are conducted by a set of 
interdependent teams from four or more companies. Mathieu et al. (2001) have labeled this 
type of organizational structure a multiteam system. Our multiteam system is engaged in high-
risk work in a demanding, potentially extreme environment (Hannah et al., 2009). We found 
that the responsibility for coordinating the teams is centralized in the role of the shift 
supervisor, which has advantages as well as limits. While the shift supervisor needs to be 
aware of everything that could potentially impact the success of the subsea operation, his 
sphere of direct influence is usually limited to what he can do from the confines of his control 
room. As we have documented above, the shift supervisor cannot always be aware of, and 
respond to, everything that can impact the success of the crucial execution phase; informal 
leadership resources supplement his centralized coordinating role. Future research could 
determine how our findings are generalizable to other kinds of reliability-seeking 
organizations that are organized as multiteam systems. In the commercial system that we 
studied, we found a different form of control slack than has been reported in research on 
	  39	  
Incident Command Systems, and on military HROs such as aircraft carriers and nuclear 
submarines. All of these organizations operate in dynamic environments where surprise is 
expected and tight coupling can lead to rapid escalation of errors. Further comparative 
research is needed to understand if, and how, organizational mission and purpose influence 
forms of distributed authority. 
 
Our study shows that slack leadership resources can be useful, but can also add complexity. It 
would be simplistic to say that organizations should just design slack into an individual’s role. 
We have identified some of the points of tension that could lead people to have different 
points of view, and that would need to be negotiated. To understand more of those tensions 
and how they are handled would be a research focus that could have implications for practice. 
As far as we are aware, the medic role is the only one where slack is built in by design. Our 
examples show, however, that other roles also involve slack that can enable individuals to 
compensate for the vulnerabilities of complexity and tight coupling. While some of our 
informants argued that the Medics had too much spare time, our research results should be 
taken into account if calls for a leaner design of these types of operations are discussed. 
 
Our informants’ evaluations of the stimulus cases provide us with insight into their thinking 
about interventions that challenge the procedural rigor of the system. However, our data have 
been collected in a situation where the informants are ‘off-line’ from their daily, busy 
interactions, and may not accurately reflect how they would react in the heat of the moment. 
A similar limitation is that informants may have downplayed controversial safety-related 
issues, given the strong public commitment that companies in this business - and regulatory 
authorities - place on safety. Future research could explore how different views about the 
appropriate implementation of control slack are negotiated ‘on-line’.   
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The Theory of Action perspective (Argyris 1990; Argyris & Schön, 1992) has proposed that 
the rules that people say they follow to cope with embarrassment or threat (their espoused 
theories) differ from the rules that actually guide their actions (their theories-in-use), and that 
individuals are unaware of this gap. Argyris and Schön have found that individual and 
organizational defenses are easily triggered when people make errors, which undercuts their 
effectiveness and ability to learn. These ideas seem to be contradicted by the extant research 
on HROs, which claims that principles of mindfulness enable HROs to cultivate a ‘healthy’ 
focus on error (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and that developing a ‘just culture’ (Dekker, 2012) 
that combines tolerance for error with focus on safety is possible (Jordan & Johannessen, 
2014). Conducting a study to illuminate these questions could be a significant contribution to 
theory. The context that we have studied, and the ambiguous situations triggered by a 
phenomenon like informal leadership redundancy, may provide a promising arena for such 
research. 
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Appendix:	  Analysis	  Template	  	  
Stimulus Case Interview: File name  
Informant:   Informant category and number 
Researcher:   Name of researcher who did the interview 
Analyst:   Name of researcher who did the analysis 
Date:      
  Existence Description Check Evaluation + -­‐ ? 	  Confirmation I	  have	  seen	  it     I	  have	  done	  it     It	  could	  have	  happened     	  Disconfirmation I	  have	  not	  seen	  it     I	  have	  not	  done	  it     It	  could	  not	  have	  happened     
 
 
Comments 
 Stimulus	  Case	  #1	  
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including 
contingencies? 
Why an intervention is necessary 
Who is the appropriate interventionist 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in 
this case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the multiteam system, including balancing 
flexibility and structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 
 Stimulus	  Case	  #2	  
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including 
contingencies?  
Why an intervention is necessary  
Who is the appropriate interventionist 
 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in 
this case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
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5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the multiteam system, including balancing 
flexibility and structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 	  Stimulus	  Case	  #3	  
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation.  
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including 
contingencies? 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in 
this case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the multiteam system, including balancing 
flexibility and structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 	  
